Clash of the Titan

Different cultures have different customs. We have different understandings of how close to stand when talking, how frequently to make eye contact, how long to pause for a response before continuing to speak.... And culture clash is inevitable in war zones, where solutions are expected from people with very different backgrounds, objectives and expectations.

So it should be no surprise that U.S. efforts to supply power in Kandahar are being undermined by cultural differences--not between Americans and Afghanis, but between the U.S. military and U.S. diplomats.

The difference boils down to cultural understandings of solutions and timetables. The U.S. military wants action now, before troop withdrawal begins in July 2011. Providing electricity is not only a useful service for the people of Kandahar, it will generate goodwill for the U.S. agents who help to bring it about. So $200 million for generators and fuel will demonstrate that the United States is capable of rapid solutions to real problems. Take that, Taliban!

On the other side of the fence are U.S. diplomats, who will remain in Afghanistan long after the troops have left. They see the project as unsustainable--just one more development program the U.S. sets up and abandons without in-country infrastructure to support it.

Surely there's a middle ground. Perhaps a smaller-scale community project could be attempted for immediate impact, while plans are made to implement regular, sustainable updates in the near future?

Such an effort would require collaboration between the military, the diplomats and the people of Kandahar. Just one more example of the need for coordination in U.S. public diplomacy. If we can't resolve the cultural differences within our own PD bodies, how can we expect to negotiate the treacherous terrain with foreign populations?

Afghanistan's Empty Playgrounds

U.S. public diplomacy acknowledges the importance of engaging foreign youths--but often that term seems to apply to adolescents and young adults, and not the very young.

For a recent NPR piece, Foreign Policy's Anna Badken visited a rural village in Afghanistan, where the child mortality rate is second only to that of Sierra Leone. At a playground near a refugee settlement stands a large billboard, erected by government contractors reading: "Title of Project: Creating Livelihood Opportunities for Refugees in North Afghanistan. Project Code: 02 AFR. Component: Play Ground and safe Play area ... Donor: Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (United States of America)."

The playground is underutilized in this part of the country, where potable water is in short supply and jobs are scarce. Many children in the camp have died before they were old enough to appreciate it--not exactly an anomaly in Afghanistan, where 28 children die every hour.

"What the billboard really says," Badken argues, "is that the international aid that is supposed to help rebuild Afghanistan is tragically failing."

From a strategic standpoint, Afghanistan's weak infrastructure is troubling, as poverty and desperation could easily drive youths to join the Taliban. From a humanitarian standpoint, the problem is even more disturbing.

Foreign aid can be a public diplomacy tool, if it represents an understanding of a population's desires. But programs that confirm the donor's ignorance of the recipients needs are unlikely to generate a flood of goodwill. Resources for aid and public diplomacy are limited, of course, and playing is an essential part of development. But you'd be hard-pressed to find a parent who'd rather give his hungry child a see-saw than a loaf of bread.

It's easy to judge the effects of foreign policy from a desk in D.C., and it's hardly fair to chastise an aid project with such good intentions. Ultimately what's underlying this problem--like the foundation of so many public diplomacy issues--is the need for coordination to make sure that intentions, actions and receptions align.

Who's Legit?

I spent this glorious weekend on the wrong side of a library (that is, the inside). But despite my disappointment at missing the beautiful April weather, I did get a lot of interesting research done. I'm currently working on a paper about U.S. radio broadcasting in Iraq and Afghanistan, and in the course of my research I stumbled across an article describing Duke Ellington's tour of the Middle East in 1963.

Although their shows were well attended, Ellington and his orchestra were disappointed to find that they were consistently playing for the nations' elites, and not for "the people," leading their sympathetic State Department handler to conclude that they had misunderstood the meaning of the word "people."

For the jazz musicians, the "people" were the working class men (and women) on the street. For the State Department, the "people" were the elites who were best positioned to help the U.S. government realize its foreign policy objectives abroad. Underneath these assumptions are questions about legitimacy. What makes a legitimate audience for public diplomacy? For the United States, the answer is often related to national security concerns. U.S. public diplomacy has traditionally been best funded during times when the nation perceived itself to be threatened (by Nazis, Soviets or terrorists, for example) and public diplomacy was seen as a tactic to counter opposition.

But by categorizing the people of foreign nations according to their legitimacy, or their utility, does public diplomacy not risk isolating vast segments of the population? And what does that reveal about underlying assumptions about those people and their culture? Somehow targeting specific segments of a society for message reception seems a little cynical and self-serving. At the very least, it seems less likely to succeed than working together with foreign publics to construct a message people in both countries can support.

You Know, for Kids!

Remember when you were a kid and you used to beg your parents to drive you to the embassy? No? Neither do I, to be honest, but among the many embassy programs that have migrated online are youth outreach efforts. Not every country has a kid-friendly page on its website, but a quick tour around the Electronic Embassy Row uncovers some interesting finds.

The Kids Corner at the Embassy of Afghanistan, for example, includes photographs, an Afghan crossword and a slide show featuring handy facts about the country. Did you know Afghanistan is home to various nomadic tribes that traverse the country seasonally, called “Kuchis”? True! The Embassy of Chile offers "Basic Information" in English and Spanish for young visitors--or so they say. Both links took me to a Spanish-language site. Denmark and Ireland both go the educational route, providing school report-friendly facts for students and merit-badge seekers. One of the most impressive sites (in terms of interactivity, age-appropriateness, style and content) was Venezuela for Kids, which crams an astounding amount of information into an engaging, kid-friendly page.

If you're curious, the U.S. embassy has a kids page, too--but not directly. You have to follow a few links to the State Department and then to the youth page, which seems to be targeting U.S. youths more than foreigners. But there's a games page where Pat the Passport will guide you through some educational games (match the flags to the country!) and teach you why public diplomacy matters.

Many embassy pages contain information and presentations that, while not kid-specific, are suitable for young visitors. In terms of nation-branding, the kids pages reveal a lot about how the country wants to be viewed abroad. They almost universally eschew any mention of foreign policy, focusing instead on culture, history, geography and people. This is outreach without any agenda beyond basic education. All in all, however, this is an area with a lot of room for expansion. So let's say you've got a fancy grant and a cracker jack staff to help you out. What would you put on the U.S. for Kids page?

Dr. Strangelove v. the Culture Club

Are European nations moving beyond a military solution towards Afghanistan, and will a policy of cultural engagement work? Al Jazeera explores the question in this video.

Cultural engagement, of course, is a broad net that covers diverse activities like photography, writing, dance, theater, music, sculpture, architecture, sports and cooking. Some of the discussants also included activities like counseling and hosted dialogue as part of the process. Kenyan youth leader George Gachara reflected on his efforts at cultural engagement following post-election violence:

We came together as young people and decided that as a country we have come to the brink of collapse, we have seen how bad things can get, but then we stepped back and get a chance to rescue and save the soul of our nation. So we decided to come up with very simple and creative projects that create a safe space for engagement amongst young people from different communities where they can reflect, they can dialogue and they can also enroll in activities that reconcile their own activities.

Gachara seemed hopeful that such collaborations would forestall future violence in his country. But will it work in Afghanistan? Ahmad Majidyar suggests that coalition forces could achieve greater success by developing locally-based solutions, instead of importing solutions from D.C. which aren't compatible with the local culture. Robin Davies of the British Council also emphasized the importance of local input. In response to a Facebook query asking why culture, ideas and opinions should be forced on others in a democratic society, Davies noted that cultural dialogue is a multi-directional, collaborative process:

Cultural dialogue and cultural relations is a relationship. It's a two-way process. It is not the imposition of one culture onto another culture.... This is a dialogue, this is mutual understanding, this is educating, sharing and connecting with people.

Neal M. Rosendorf would certainly agree. We recently read "A Cultural Public Diplomacy Strategy" for class. In it, Rosendorf argues that cultural diplomacy is essential to U.S. foreign policy and reputation reform. One point Rosendorf raises that does not come up in this video is the issue of financing. Currently, the U.S. government allocates considerably more money to the nation's military budget than it does to its diplomacy budget, indicating a lack of appreciation for the benefits of skillful cultural diplomacy. But as Rosendorf (and General Stanley McChrystal) would argue, military victory is impossible without the support of the other nation's citizens. Sure, sure, the best things in life are free--but some of the really essential things cost a mint. And they're worth investing in.

What We Need Now Is Leadership

Vice President Dick Cheney attacked John Kerry. He said that John Kerry "lacks deeply held convictions." Today Kerry shot back. He said, "That's not completely true."

Jay Leno, author of the above quote, is hardly the first comedian to rib Senator Kerry for straddling the fence or waffling. In this Al Jazeera interview, Kerry demonstrates his ongoing ability to see both sides of an issue, although accusations of waffling may be unjust. Regarding the Taliban, Kerry argues that schools, education, development and dialogue are central to improvement. He emphasizes the importance of talking with Taliban fighters and helping Afghanistan to create a more effective government, but dances around the issue of current military operations there. Ultimately, his is a message that promotes open dialogue and empowering the people. Despite over 1,200 views (at the time of this posting), the video's comments feature has been disabled, making it difficult to determine how Kerry's message has been received.

Kerry, as mentioned in this blog, has advocated for revamped public diplomacy in the country, arguing that negative attitudes about our country are caused by "honest disagreements with our policies and our actions" as well as "misrepresentations of our goals, values and motives targeted at those prepared to believe the worst about us."

Few would argue that U.S. goals, values and motives have been misrepresented in Afghanistan, and that U.S. efforts to reframe the story have been countered by opposing views. But how can the United States hope to set the record straight when our nation's representatives call for dialogue and shortly thereafter launch a major offensive? Kerry explains the seeming incongruity with the deftness of a seasoned politician. But the people influenced by the military's actions likely outnumber the people who have been exposed to U.S. information efforts, and it's easy to believe that the military's presence in Afghanistan will continue to generate conflicting, and frequently negative, responses in the region until our policy, action and communication align more simply.